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BOOK REVIEW
THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN LAW ON ENGLISH AND COMMONWEALTH
LAW. Jerome B. Elkind, ed. St. Paul: West Publishing Company,

1978. Pp. xvii, 372.
Selection of a book title is an important editorial act, especially
in the field of scholarly literature where a precise description of a
book is necessary to ensure its proper classification and increase
its pptential use. There can be no greater disservice to authors than
the assignation of wrong titles to their works by inept or ambitious
editors and publishers. Finding a suitable title is especially difficult for the collective work of a number of authors writing on
unrelated topics. It is for this reason that the tradition of using
such terms as "essays," "Feitschrift," or "melange" in the titles
of collective works has evolved in Europe. These terms trigger the
attention of bibliographers to the fact that the respective works
might require separate in-depth indexing for the individual contributions in trade journals, indices, and trade services. Subject classification and indexing become particularly indispensable attributes in scholarly literature, since the predominant function of
scholarly literature is. to communicate information rather than
offer literary pleasure.
The question of title selection becomes especially relevant in the
context of a discussion of the book herein under review, The Impact of American Law on English and Commonwealth Law. The
title is overly ambitious. It suggests a work of broad compass,
perhaps containing a systematic survey of the influence and application of the American' legal doctrine in other common law countries. A definite need exists for a study of that kind. While legal
scholars in the United States and other common law countries
have published innumerable works comparing their respective
laws in specific areas, no comprehensive study has yet been undertaken concerning the acceptance of American legal ideas and
methods in England and other Commonwealth countries. An empirical analysis of whether and to what extent American law has
had any impact at all on the development of the law in the other
common law countries would be both interesting and valuable.
Unfortunately, despite its title, this book does not provide that
analysis.
1. In accordance with the author's usage of the terms, "American" and
"United States" are used interchangeably throughout this book review.
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The Impact of American Law on English and Commonwealth
Law is merely a collection of seven essays on unrelated legal topics.
The authors are present or former members of the University of
Auckland Faculty of Law, the largest and foremost of the four law
schools in New Zealand. The editor of the book, Jerome B. Elkind,
is an American attorney who teaches now at the University of
Auckland. He inspired the emphasis on American law in the writing of the essays, and he eventually combined them under a title
highlighting the American law emphasis.
The essays deal with such diverse subjects as constitutional protection of personal rights, judicial review of the constitutionality
of legislation, legal elimination of racial discrimination, product
liability, defense to restitution, inequitable incorporation, divorce
without fault, and statutory interpretation. All of the essays have
two common elements which establish a tenuous link among them
despite their significant thematic differences. First, the description and analysis of the relevant legal developments in all of the
subject areas extend more or less broadly across the jurisdictional
boundaries of England, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and
other"Commonwealth" countries which embrace the jurisprudential tradition of the common law. All of the essays adopt a comparative approach of presentation in the sense that the discussion on
each subject proceeds sequentially from one jurisdiction to another. Although this approach is informative in its description of
the relevant state of law in each jurisdiction, it falls short of the
more penetrating and conceptual method of comparison practiced
by such leading comparativists as Rabel, Schlesinger, Zweigert,
Tunc, and others.2 Second, in accordance with the editor's instructions, an effort is made in each essay to examine the state of
American law on the topic in question and to determine the extent
of its potential influence or utility in the development of the respective legal systems in the Commonwealth countries. In some
instances the references to American law are sketchy; elsewhere
the discussion is more detailed and thorough, demonstrating a
good understanding of relevant American law.
2. See, e.g., E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE

STUDY

(2d ed.

1958); E. RABEL, DAs RECHT DES WARFNKAUFS (1967); M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE
STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAw (1972); R. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS

(K. Zweigert & U.
Drobnig eds. 1971). The scheme of comparative analysis adopted for use in the
Encyclopedia was described in Drobnig, In the InternationalEncyclopedia of
(1968); INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoMPARATIVE LAW

ComparativeLaw: Efforts Toward a Worldwide Comparison of Law, 5 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 113 (1972).
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In his essay on race relations, Jerome B. Elkind comes close to
the development of a useful conceptual analysis through a skillful
discussion of American decisions and statutes, within the context
of the problem encountered by the English antidiscrimination legislation in the course of its rough and uneven development. R.J.
Sutton's essay on restitution, although very narrow in scope because it deals only with the defense of "change of circumstances,"
contains a lengthy review of recent American law on this point.
Pauline Vaver presents a good overview of the historical evaluation
of no-fault divorce in the United States in an essay which shows a
definite influence of the late Max Rheinstein, with whom Ms.
Vaver must have studied during her time at the University of
Chicago as a Bigelow Fellow. Although these authors present an
accurate description of the state of the law, none of them offer
convincing evidence of the influence of the American law on the
laws of the Commonwealth countries. Some, like Elkind, endeavor
to find a link between the laws of the respective jurisdictions whose
origins may lie in the United States, but none are able to present
a convincing case for even a moderate embracement of the American law within the Commonwealth. Reasons for this will be explored at the conclusion of this review.
The essays differ considerably in style and editorial organization. Some, like David Williams' essay on constitutional law, Michael Whincup's essay on product liability, and Pauline Vaver's
discussion of divorce without fault, are descriptive surveys. R.J.
Sutton's essay on the defense of "change of circumstance" consists
really of two papers, one on English law and the other on American
law. Michael Whincup's discussion of inequitable incorporation is
in effect a brief in favor of a reform of the English law on that
point. Jerome B. Elkind uses an analytical approach in his essay
on race relations and goes beyond mere comparative description,
viewing English law in the context of United States issues. The
book also contains a second essay by Mr. Elkind, inappropriately
entitled "Overview and Conclusion," since it is merely another
essay which examines the different approaches toward statutory
construction developed in the United States and England. This
essay is particularly interesting because, in addition to its readability and schoarship, it reaches the rather surprising conclusion
that the American legal attitude on statutory construction more
closely resembles the methods developed in the civil law countries
of Western Europe than the traditional legislative approaches of
England and other common law jurisdictions. This thesis is one
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which has not received general scholarly acceptance. 3
Has the American law influended legal development in other
countries? The question is not at all academic when it is remembered that the United States has consciously spent many millions
of dollars in the past three decades on the dissemination of American legal ideas throughout the world-perhaps as a countermeasure to the spread of Marxist ideology, in which case the experiment has not been very successful.
There is nothing particularly unusual or distinctive about the
deliberate borrowing of one country's legal texts and ideas by another country; transplantation of law is a common historical occurrenceJ The successful migration of the English legal system to
many other parts of the world or the adoption of the Justinian
interpretation of Roman law by the European countries offer cogent examples of that fact. In addition, many historical examples
of direct copying exist, both as a result of voluntary cooption and
involuntary enforcement of the laws of another state. French, German, and Swiss codes have served as models for the codification
and modernization of laws in Africa, Asia, and Latin America;
Soviet codes have been adopted in Eastern Europe and Cuba (the
new Cuban family code, for instance, is a fairly accurate facsimile
of its Soviet counterpart); and, more recently, legislation on economic and technological matters in some of the developing countries of Africa shows a considerable predisposition for similarity to
that of the Common Market countries.
Of course, the adoption of foreign laws as one's own is dependent
upon the existence of the appropriate socio-political and economic
conditions, since law is a subordinate instrument of the ideological, moral, or practical goals of the society it is expected to serve.
All of the above examples illustrate successful transplantations of
law where the economic and political circumstances were conducive to their reception and enforcement. Although nothing at all
has been written about unsuccessful transplantations, an opportunity may exist presently to study such a failure in Ethiopia,
3. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KCdTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1977).
This work was originally published in German as K. ZWEIGERT & H. KoTz, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS (1971).
See also W.

FIKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS

(1975-1978).

4. See

A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Compative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV.

(1974);
1 (1974); Stein, Uses, Misuses-and Nonuses of ComparativeLaw, 72 Nw. L. REv.
198 (1977); Watson, Legal Transplantsand Law Reform, 92 L.Q. Rnv. 79 (1976).
(1976).
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where intensive work on legal reform by a large number of eminent
legal scholars over a period of several decades may be rendered
useless as a result of radical political change.5
In view of the absence of satisfactory documentary evidence
about unsuccessful transplantations, legal science knows very little
about the precise mechanisms for the acceptance or rejection of
foreign legal norms by other countries. It is possible to speculate
in such circumstances about the interdependence of law and political or economic conditions, but a profusion of minute factual differences between one situation and another produces too many
variables to derive any meaningful conclusions. Further, the acceptance or rejection of a foreign legal concept may frequently
depend on the whim of an individual. A judge may not wish to
follow a foreign precedent because he lacks knowledge about that
legal system, or a legislator may refuse to use a foreign law as a
model for political reasons.
What seems to distinguish the recent American efforts to disseminate its legal ideas abroad from other transplantations of foreign law are the policy reasons which initially induced the United
States to enter the field of transnational legal reform and the
method which scholars and officials developed to further that policy.' It may be fair to say that the United States stumbled into this
field by accident, but that it thereafter pursued the accidental
goals with characteristic national vigor and a doctrinaire sense of
commitment. In the course of its involvement in transnational
legal reform, the United States dedicated immense financial, professional, and educational resources toward the furtherance of
legal values which it believed to be necessary for the improvement
of living conditions and personal rights in other countries. It is not
surprising that these values also happened to represent fundamental principles of American law. Lawyers in the United States as
elsewhere tend to have conservative and patriotic attitudes in matters relating to their professional education and training without
regard for their political tendencies. When they are asked to develop legislative models for other countries, they tend to see them
in the image of American law.
5. On the law reform in Ethiopia, see Beckstrom, Handicaps of Legal-Social
Engineering in a Developing Nation, 22 AM. J. Comp. L. 697 (1974); Beckstrom,
Transplantationof Legal Systems: An Early Report on the Reception of Western
Laws in Ethiopia, 21 AM. J. CoMP. L. 557 (1973).
6. See Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins,
Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J.
COMP. L. 457 (1977).
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The first indications of the United States' involvement in transnational legal reform occurred in the last days of the Second World
War and during the immediate postwar years. The United States
had emerged from the war as the wealthiest and strongest nation
in the world. Relatively unaffected by the ravages of war, it possessed a highly developed industrial system, an excess of food
products, and a sound economic base.
The effects of the war were unbelievably devastating and horrible in Europe and Asia. Millions of people, most of them innocent
victims of circumstance, had needlessly lost their lives. Many more
millions were displaced from their homelands. Cities were destroyed; industry was obliterated. All of the vanquished and most
of the victorious nations were completely impoverished; their
people were physically and spiritually exhausted. Through the
complete annihilation or extensive weakening of states which
had wielded international dominance in the years prior to the war,
a serious vacuum came into existence in the political and legal
structure of the world, and the situation was further aggravated
by actual or threatened territorial encroachments of the Soviet
Union. Alone among the countries of the western world, the
United States was economically and militarily capable of stepping
into the international void with the practical effect of restoring
some semblance of peace and order. It assumed the role of
leadership in the western world. History will tell whether the
United States has performed well the responsibilities hoisted
upon it by the sudden imposition of global supremacy.
The United States has performed one meritorious deed in this
capacity which already stands to its credit. Although this deed is
frequently forgotten today, it is without precedent in the whole
history of mankind. Immediately after the conclusion of the war,
the United States engaged in an act of exceptional humanitarian
generosity by establishing a massive program of economic and
technical assistance to all needy nations of the world. Though it is
pointed out from time to time that the program was motivated by
political considerations, it remains nevertheless a monument to
American magnanimity. This aid was the only practical method
of enabling the world to endure the first postwar years and then
begin a steady climb toward recovery. In later years, when the
range of this international assistance program was expanded, the
consequences of its benefits became applicable to countries in the
less developed areas of the world.
Concurrently with the development of economic aid, the United
States also found itself in the position of being required to administer occupied territories and redesign the legal systems of the van-
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quished nations. 7 A large task force of American lawyers was mobilized to perform these functions, and it is therefore not surprising
that the postwar legislation in Germany and Japan bears some
resemblance to American laws. For the American lawyers it was
the first experience of transplanting their legal ideas and values to
other countries. Although United States laws had been previously
utilized in foreign countries, those countries were generally underdeveloped (as in the case of the Philippines and the islands in the
Caribbean) or the circumstances were unique (as in the case of the
Canal Zone and the American Court in China). In the case of
postwar Europe and Japan, United States lawyers for the first time
faced the necessity of redeveloping socieites which could fully
relate to American ideas. Because of their own levels of development the situation presented an opportunity to turn those ideas
into concrete legislative concepts. This instant "social engineering" could not have been more satisfying to United States lawyers
nurtured on the ideas of Pound, Llewelyn, and other American
pragmatists.' For whatever reasons, the transplanations were successful and the experience was exhilerating.
It is suggested that this first experience and its relative success
were directly responsible for the subsequent unshakable belief of
American lawyers in the universal applicability of their legal values. An opinion slowly began to form among enthusiatic comparativists that American law not only reflected the operation of an
economy in a highly advanced industrial society, but also was its
motivating force. From this belief it was only a short step to the
conjecture that American legal methods could be used in combination with economic and technical means to erase the endemic poverty and injustice in less developed countries.
Government and private institutions, including the Agency for
International Development, the Ford Foundation and the International Legal Center, and the Asia Foundation were persuaded to
make substantial grants for the study and modernization of foreign
legal systems, especially in developing countries. The modernization efforts under such grants were to be carried out within the
conceptual framework of the American legal system as a means
toward the ultimate improvement of social and economic condi7. See H.

HOLBORN, AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT

(1947); A.

OPPLER,

LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK (1976).
8. On social engineering, see R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942);

Pound, The Theory of JudicialDecision (pts. 1-3) 36 HARv. L. REv. 641, 802, 940
(1923); White, From Sociological Jurisprudenceto Realism: Jurisprudenceand
Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. Rlv. 999 (1972).
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tions in developing countries. Many legal scholars from the United
States began to travel to foreign countries in order to teach and
learn there. Language was a frequent barrier to meaningful research into the intricacies of laws in foreign countries. Yet the
immediate results seemed surprisingly successful. Foreign lawyers
and law students acquired kiowledge about the American legal
system and expressed admiration for the refreshing, problemoriented, instructional methods of their American teachers. At the
expense of the United States government or American private
foundations, many students from foreign countries were brought
annually to the United States to study American law in American
law schools. The full substantive impact of this educational process has not yet been fully appreciated. Although the question of
whether the subsequent attitudes of those foreign students toward
American law correspond to the objectives of the institutions they
attended, the institutions in question clearly had some effect upon
the students. Many foreign students indicated an admiration and
a preference for American legal values, while others expressd a
disappointment in the United States and the decline of its values.
This educational impact issue becomes increasingly important
since many of the foreign students of American law schools now
occupy high professional or political positions in their own countries.
Meanwhile, in the early 1950's, American business enterprises
began to increase their activities and to establish foreign branches.
Economically dominant, they were able to exert an incredible
influence on the living patterns and cultural preferences of people
in many other parts of the world. From soft drinks and movies to
automobiles and kitchen appliances, United States business was
more responsible for the acceleration of changes in consumer expectations and wants than any other single force. Although American business abroad was subsequently berated in ServanSchreiber's American Challenge9 and a number of successive
books, and eventually earned the pejorative name of
"transnationals," the business methods and industrial processes of
American enterprises were eagerly copied by the governments and
people of foreign countries. The ensuing changes in international
postwar economic practices gave rise to a greater curiosity in
American commercial and corporate law principles. New laws to
deal with more liberal credit and investment attitudes became
necessary, to provide the flexibility and self-determination in fi9.

J. SERVAN-SCHREBER, AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1965).
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nance, corporate organization, and labor relations. Although
American laws were sometimes copied directly in such circumstances, they were more frequently studied carefully for alternative
solutions for the new practical problems faced by other nations.
Thus, aside from the impact of American legal education methods
which were received with acclaim by the law students in many
foreign countries, the areas of American law with the greatest influence abroad are its commercial and corporate segments. This
obvious conclusion is frequently disregarded by American legal
scholars who are ideologically committed to the "social engineering" aspects of law and who wish to use it in a transnational setting
as a tool to improve the economic and social conditions of foreign
societies through legal reform.
It required the sobering adjustments of the 1970s, when the economic and political costs of financing international development
projects suddenly became prohibitive, for the various research
groups to realize that their efforts to introduce American legal
values in other countries may not have been justified. Contrary to
the earlier beliefs, legal ideas were found to be less easily exportable than food or industrial know-how. It was also determined that
an externally induced legal reform is not necessarily a panacea for
social and economic ills and can sometimes produce spurious or
converse results.
With regard to the reception of American law by foreign countries the researchers could report only a few scattered instances of
direct causality between their efforts and the ensuing acceptance
of the legal solution suggested by them. In all other respects the
transplantation effort was largely a failure. The story of that failure is candidly analyzed in several recent articles by distinguished
comparativists and "law and development" specialists, including
Merryman and Trubek. ' John Hazard, the leading expert on comparative law in the United States today, concludes that:
[Tihe action-oriented American approach has been incompatible
with the intellectual styles and legal cultures of most developing
countries, because the principal legal tradition in these countries,
like the civil law on which it is based, is more academic and more
concerned with theory than the American approach. The American
law and development movement has failed largely because of a lack
10. Merryman, supra note 5; Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in SelfEstrangement:Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies
in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062.
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of communication-the developing countries are not able to understand the "language" of the American approach."
The editor of The Impact of American Law on Englishand Commonwealth Law quite sensibly wishes to avoid the rise of disappointment created by such doctrinal differences between American
law and civil law. To be on the safe side of finding at least some
favorable instances for the receptability of American law abroad,
he confines his inquiry to the influence of American statutes and
case law on legal developments in the other common law countries.
In this respect his inquiry stands on more comfortable ground.
American law will undoubtedly be better understood in other common law countries because the antecedents are the same. The
findings with respect to United States transplantation in common
law countries may also be more valuable from a scholarly as well
as a practical standpoint. The degree of acceptance of American
law in the Commonwealth countries, espousing the uniform tradition of the common law but with significantly different levels of
legal and economic development, may produce a useful measuring
rod for the intrinsic exportability of Amercian legal ideas and concepts.
Yet, as the different essays in this book conclusively demonstrate, the results of this inquiry are just as disappointing as the
findings of legal scholars investigating the reception of American
law in other parts of the world. The use of American case law in
the Commonwealth countries is desultory and frequently erroneous (for example, it is evident in the essay on constitutional law
that the application by the Indian Supreme Court of American
constitutional cases in the interpretation of the Indian constitution
is more literary than jurisprudential, though the author of the
essay does not point out this curious aberration).
In contrast to United States case law, American statutes seem
to receive more attention in the numerous law reform inquiries
conducted by various permanent or temporary commissions which
exist now in almost all Commonwealth countries. However, although they are frequently observed, American statutes are almost
never used in the drafting of legislation. A marked difference exists
in the style, language, and approach of American drafting and
English statutory drafting which continues to be used in Commonwealth countries. Little room remains, therefore, for adoption of
the more ostentatious language of American statutes. Some of the
11.

Hazard, Development and "New Law," 45 U. Cm. L. Rav. 637 (1978).
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contributors to this book try to establish tenuous relationships
between statutes of American origin and their Commonwealth
counterparts, but these efforts are inconclusive. In the end, the
editor is forced to admit that "English and Commonwealth judges
strenuously resist using American law . . . [and] when they do
. . . it is often with little real understanding. ' 12 It follows that

"practitioners do ignore American law."'" Perhaps the American
law, in the words of Erwin Griswold, is "the most complicated legal
structure that has ever been devised and made effective in man's
effort to govern himself.""
Nevertheless, teachers and students continually discover that no
fundamental differences exist between American law and the laws
of the traditional Commonwealth countries (England, Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand). The major principles, concepts, and
methods are virtually identical, and exchanges between lawyers of
those jurisdictions are quite intelligible and meaningful. A scholarly tradition of comparing special subject areas of American law
with their Commonwealth counterparts, of which this book of essays is a good example, is actively pursued in all of the common
law countries. More than thirty articles of this type were published
in American and Commonwealth law reviews in the last four years
alone.' 5 Several treatises, including John Fleming's classic Law of

Torts,'6 have successfully straddled the geographic boundaries of
12. THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN LAW ON ENGLISH AND COMMONWEALTH LAW,
(J. Elkind ed. 1978).
13. Id.
14. E. GRISWOLD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1964).

at ix

15. For some typical recent examples, see Covington, American and British
Employment DiscriminationLaw: An Introductory Comparative Survey, 10
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359 (1977); Davidow, Obscenity Laws in England and the
United States: A Comparative Analysis, 56 NEB. L. REV. 249 (1977); Davies,
Canadianand American Attitudes on Insider Trading, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 215
(1975); Farrar, Aspects of Police Search and Seizure Without Warrant in England
and the United States, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491 (1975); Gibson, Products Liability
in the United States and England: The Difference and Why, 3 ANGLO-AM. L. REV.
493 (1974); Grosh, Trustee Investment: English Law and the American Prudent
Man Rule, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 748 (1974); Honsberger, Bankruptcy Administration in the United States and Canada, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1515 (1975); Laskin,
Comparative Constitutional Law-Common Problems: Australia, Canada,
United States of America, 51 AUST. L.J. 450 (1977); Mason, Share Dealings by a
Company's Officers: An Australian-American Comparison, 12 U. W. AUST. L.
REV. 153 (1975); Palmer, Social Engineering in New Zealand and the United
States: A Comparison of Approaches to Tort Reform, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
315 (1978); Ziegel, American Influences on the Development of CanadianCommercial Law, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 861 (1976).
16. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1977).
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the major common law jurisdictions and merged their respective
case law into a common system. Students and teachers can easily
move between law schools in the United States and other common
law countries without losing their ability to understand and communicate.
The limited use of American case law in the Commonwealth
countries should not be surprising. With the exception of English
cases, the decisions of other Commonwealth countries receive the
same indifferent treatment in all Commonwealth jurisdictions; the
English courts studiously ignore the decisions of other Commonwealth countries. For that matter, American courts do not consult
the case law of English and other Commonwealth countries all too
frequently. Espinoza v. FarahManufacturing Co. 7 is a recent example in point. In that case the Supreme Court was asked to
interpret the meaning of the terms "nationality" and "national
origin" as used. in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In delivering the
opinion of the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall did not make any
reference to the English case of Ealing London Borough Council v.
Race Relations Board'" which had been decided by the House of
Lords one year earlier. The editor of the book under review discusses the two cases in his essay on race relations and then again
in the concluding essay on statutory interpretation, but he does not
point out this obvious "parochial" oversight of the United States
Supreme Court.
It is, of course, possible that the true quality of the common law
is not in its cases, statutes, or other external manifestations. Perhaps its primary influence is indirect, and one must look for the
principal attributes of the "migratory" values of the English law
as the source for all common law in its uncanny ability to induce
local autonomy in each of its successful transplanations and yet
make them all cling to certain common traditions in legal methodology, reasoning, and attitude. It is in these areas of jurisprudence
that the common law has its greatest impact on societies with
other legal traditions or cultures. The successful influence of the
common law may thus be described as subtle and indirect, imperceptibly altering social and political opinions rather than formally
changing legal rules. In a wider sense of inquiry the common law
is inextricably bound with political ideas of human equality, individual freedom and judicial impartiality. The Impact of American
17. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
18. [1972] 2 W.L.R. 71; [1972] 1 All E.R. 105.

Fall 1978]

BOOK REVIEW

865

Law on English and Commonwealth Law might have profited from
deeper analyses along these lines.
Igor I. Kavass*
* Professor of Law and Director of the Law Library, Vanderbilt University;

Visiting Professor of Law, Free University of Berlin; President, International
Association. of Law Libraries. LL.B., 1956, University of Melbourne.

